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 Game Theory 
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Game theory was developed as a tool for rational decision-making.  
Its basic concepts were later used in evolutionary game theory to 
describe the evolution of behavioral phenotypes. In the hands of 
evolutionary biologists, this merger of game theory and population 
dynamics became an important tool for analysing frequency-dependent 
selection and social interaction. 
 
I. Game theory 
 
Game theory, as originally created by mathematicians and economists, 
addresses problems confronting decision makers with diverging interests 
(such as firms competing for a market, staff officers in opposing camps 
or players engaged in a parlor game). The 'players' have to choose 
between strategies whose payoff depends on their rivals' strategies. This 
interdependence leads to mutual outguessing (she thinks that I think that 
she thinks...). There usually is no solution which is  
unconditionally optimal, i.e., which maximizes a player’s utility 
function, no matter what the co-players are doing. In contrast to such 
mutual dependence, monopolists can optimize their 
budget allocations without having to worry that others will anticipate 
their  decisions. An optimization problem may be fraught with 
uncertainty, or computationally complex, but usually, what is meant by a 
solution stands beyond doubt. In game theory, this need not be the case. 
Even in the simple game of ‘matching pennies’ (two players I and II 
choose independently between two alternatives, I wins if the two agree, 
and II if they differ), no outcome can leave both players satisfied.  
 
A player can choose between alternative moves, or strategies. Since it is 
often useful to be unpredictable, a player may also choose a mixed 
strategy, i.e., opt with specific probabilities for this or that 
alternative. It can be shown that for any game, there exist at least one 
set of strategies (one for each player) which are best replies to each 
other (see Box 1). In this case, no player has an incentive to deviate 
from his or her strategy, as long as the other players stick to theirs. 
This defines a Nash equilibrium. (In the matching pennies game, both 
players have to choose with probability 1/2 between the two alternatives; 
as this example shows, Nash equilibria need not exist if mixed strategies 
are not admitted). 
 
The notion of a Nash equilibrium satisfies a minimal consistency 
requirement for the ‘solution’ of a game (since otherwise, at least one 
player would deviate from it), but it presents a series of pitfalls. 
Consider, for instance, the following ‘helping game’, where two players 
have independently to decide whether or not to confer a benefit b to the 
other player, at a cost c to themselves. If b>c, they would both earn b-
c>0 by cooperating. But since it is better to defect, i.e., not to incur 
the cost, each player’s best reply, irrespective of the other’s decision, 
is to defect. The unique Nash equilibrium, in the helping game, is thus 
mutual defection. This game thus displays a ‘social dilemma’: the pursuit 
of self-interest is self-defeating. In other games, there exist several 
Nash equilibria, and the choice of the right can be a tricky issue. A 
large part of classical game theory deals with equilibrium refinements 
and equilibrium selection. 
 
 
    II. Evolutionary game theory 
 
In the context of evolutionary biology, the two central concepts of game 
theory, namely strategy and payoff, have to be re-interpreted.  A 
strategy is not a deliberate plan of action, but an inheritable trait, 
for instance a behavioral program. Payoff is not given by a utility scale 
indicating subjective preferences, but by Darwinian fitness, i.e., 
average reproductive success. The 'players' are members of a population, 
competing for a larger share of descendants. If several variants of a 
trait occur in a population, then natural selection favors the variants 
conferring higher fitness. But if the success of the trait is frequency-
dependent, then an increase of the frequency of variant may lead to a 
composition of the population for which other variants do better.  
Similar situations are studied in population ecology. Thus, if prey is 
abundant, predators increase for a while. But this increase reduces the 
abundance of prey, and therefore leads to a decrease of the predators. 
Evolutionary game theory can be viewed as the ecology of behavioral 
programs. 
 
A classical example, which led Maynard Smith to develop evolutionary game 
theory, is provided by inner-specific contests. Assume that there are two 
behaviorally distinct types: 'Hawks' escalate the fight until the injury 
of one contestant settles the issue, whereas Doves' stick to some form of 
conventional display (a pushing match, for instance, where injuries are 
practically excluded), and give up as soon as the adversary escalates. If 
most contestants are 'Doves', 'Hawks' will be able to settle every 
conflict in their favor, with a corresponding gain in fitness. Hence, 
'Hawks' will spread. If most contestants are 'Hawks', however, then 
escalating a conflict will lead with probability one-half to injury. If 
the object of the fight is not worth the injury, then the 'Dove' trait 
will spread. No trait is unconditionally  
better than the other. 'Hawks' can only spread if their frequency is 
below G/C, where G is the value of the contested object and C the cost of 
an injury (both measured in terms of fitness). If their frequency is 
higher, it will diminish. Oversimplified as it is, this thought 
experiment shows that heavily armed species, for which the risk of injury 
is large, are particularly prone to conventional displays, i.e., ritual 
fighting. This fact had been observed empirically, but before the advent 
of evolutionary game theory, it was erroneously interpreted as 
benefitting the 'good for the species'. 
 
[Place Fig. 1 near here] 
 
A large number of behavioral traits, but also of morphological or 
physiological characters, such as the length of antlers, or the height of 
trees, are subject to frequency dependent selection. Trees invest 
considerable resources into growth, for instance, because neighboring 
trees do. To fall behind, in such an ‘arms race’, means to give up a 
place in the sun. Traits subject to frequency-dependent selection occur 
in many types of conflicts between two individuals, for instance 
concerning territorial disputes (between neighbors), division of parental 
investment (between male and female), or length of weaning period 
(between parents and offspring). Moreover, frequency-dependent selection 
also occurs without antagonistic encounters, as when individuals are 
'playing the field'. The sex ratio is a well-studied example. In the 
simplest scenarios, the rule is simple: if the sex-ratio is biased 
towards males, it pays to produce daughters, and vice versa. Under 
specific conditions, however, occurring with inbreeding or local 
competition for males, the sex-ratio may evolve away from 1:1. Other 
examples of frequency-dependent selection concern the dispersal rate 
among offspring, the readiness to emit an alarm-call, or the amount of 
time spent on the look-out for predators. 
 
The evolution of cooperation is one of the best-studied chapters of 
evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, this is modeled by the helping 
game described above. If an individual is equally likely to be potential 
recipient or donor in a given encounter, then a population of cooperators 
would earn, on average, b-c>0  per interaction, and be better off that a 
population of defectors earning 0. But an individual would always 
increase its fitness by refusing to help, and hence we should not see 
cooperation.  
 
Game theorists have encapsulated this social dilemma in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma (PD) game. In this game, each player can choose between the two 
strategies C (to cooperate) and D (to defect).  Two C players will get a 
reward R which is higher than the punishment P obtained by two  D 
players. But a D player exploiting a C player obtains a payoff T 
(temptation to defect) which is higher than R, and this leaves the C 
player with the sucker's payoff S which is lower than P. A rational 
player will always play D, which is the better move no matter what the 
co-player is doing. Two rational players will each end up with payoff P 
instead of R (see Fig 2).  
 
Many species engage in interactions which seem to be of Prisoner's 
Dilemma type. Vampire bats feed each other, monkeys engage in 
allogrooming, vervet monkeys utter alarm calls, birds join in anti-
predator behavior, which includes vigilance and mobbing, guppies and 
stickleback cooperate in predator inspection, hermaphroditic sea bass 
alternate as egg-spenders, many species of birds engage in nest helping, 
lions in cooperative hunting or joint territorial defense. It is 
difficult, however, to measure the lifetime fitness of free-living 
animals, and in many cases, it remains doubtful whether a given type of 
encounter is really of the Prisoner’s dilemma type, i.e., satisfies the 
inequalities T>R>P>S. Some of the afore-mentioned examples could be 
instances of by-product mutualism, in which both players are best served 
by cooperating and none is tempted to defect. Other types of encounters  
(for instance, the Hawk-Dove game) may have the structure of a so-called 
Chicken game (with T>R>S>P), in which the best reply to the co-player's  
C is a D, but the best reply to a D is a C. In both cases, cooperation 
(at least by one partner) is no paradox.  
 
There are several ways in which the Prisoner's dilemma can be overcome. 
In general, any form of associative interaction favors cooperation. Such 
association may be due to kinship, to partner choice, to the ostracism of 
defectors or simply to spatial structure and limited dispersal.  Indeed, 
if players can only interact with their nearest neighbors, then clusters 
of cooperators can grow. This spatial aspect of game theory is likely to 
operate for many sessile organisms. 
Moreover, if interactions of the Prisoner's dilemma type are repeated 
between the same two individuals, players can have the option to break up 
partnerships, or vary the amount of cooperation, depending on past 
experience. But even without these options, the strategy of always 
defecting is not invariably the best option in the Iterated 
Prisoner's dilemma (IPD game). If the probability of a further round is 
sufficiently high, then even a small amount of conditional cooperators 
suffices to favor cooperation. The best known example of such a 
discriminating strategy is Tit For Tat (TFT). A TFT-player cooperates in 
the first round and from then on always repeats whatever the co-player 
did in the previous round (see Fig.3). 
  
The best examples for reciprocation may be found in human societies.   
Among humans, moreover, reciprocation is often indirect. An act of 
assistance is returned, not by the recipient, but by a third party. A 
prerequisite is that players know enough about each other. This condition 
is likely to hold if groups are close-knit and individuals can exchange 
information about each other. 
 
III. Game dynamics 
 
The major new tool of evolutionary game theory consists in using 
population dynamics. This ‘technology transfer’ from population ecology 
relies on the assumption that successful traits spread. If there are only 
two possible types A and B, for instance, then essentially only three 
scenarios are possible, depending on whether a minority of one type can 
invade a resident population consisting of the other type only (see 
Fig.4): 
(a) A can invade B but B cannot invade A. In this case, the dominant 
strategy A will always out-compete B. This happens with the Prisoner's 
dilemma, if A-players defect and B-players cooperate. 
(b) A can invade B and B can invade A. This leads to the coexistence of 
both types in stable proportions as, for instance, if A are 'Hawks' and B 
are 'Doves'. 
(c) no type can invade the other. This is a bi-stable situation; whoever 
exceeds a certain threshold will outcompete the other. This happens with 
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma if A is TFT and B always defects.  
 
With three types A, B and C, the game dynamics becomes considerably more 
complex, in part because 'rock-paper-scissors'-cycles can occur: A is 
dominated by B, B by C, and C in turn by A. Several such situations have 
been documented. In cultures of E. coli, for instance, the wild type A 
can be superseded by a mutant strain B killing the competitors by 
producing colicin, which acts as a poison. Simultaneously, this mutation 
produces a protein conferring immunity against the poison to its bearer. 
A population of type B can be superseded by a further mutant type C which 
produces the immunity protein but not the colicin (since this poison is 
inefficient in a population consisting of types B and C). In turn, type C 
can be invaded and eliminated by type A. Another rock-paper-scissors 
cycle has been found among males of the lizard Uta stantibus. The three 
types correspond to inheritable male mating strategies. Type A forms no 
lasting bonds but looks for sneaky matings; type B lives monogamously and 
closely guards the female; and C guards a harem of several females, of 
course less closely.  
 
Depending on the parameters, evolutionary models of rock-paper-scissors 
games either lead to the stable coexistence of all three strategies or to 
oscillations with increasing amplitude which lead to the recurrent 
elimination of the three types (see Fig.5). The competition of male 
lizards displays the former type of dynamics, and that of E.coli bacteria 
the latter. 
 
With four or more types competing, game dynamics can become yet more 
complex. The frequencies of the different types can keep oscillating in a 
regular or chaotic fashion. In addition to the dynamics describing 
frequency-dependent selection among a given set of types, mutations can 
produce new types occasionally. This usually proceeds at another time 
scale. Evolutionary game theory allows studying both short-term and long-
term evolution. For the latter, it is often convenient to assume that the 
transient effects following a random mutation have settled down before 
the next mutation occurs. As long as the population consists of one type 
only, this leads to a trait substitution sequence: the fate of a mutant, 
i.e., its fixation or elimination, is settled before the next mutation 
occurs. The path of the corresponding 'adaptive dynamics' can lead to 
evolutionary stable states immune against further invasion (see ESS) or 
to ‘branching points’ where the population  splits up and becomes 
polymorphic.  
 
Game dynamics can also be used to analyze the interactions between 
different subpopulations (such as males and females, or territorial 
owners and intruders). A fast-growing branch of evolutionary game theory 
deals with structured populations: here, the assumption of random 
encounters is replaced by that of interaction networks.   
 
Evolutionary game theory deals with phenotypes, and usually assumes that 
‘like begets like’. With sexual replication, however, this assumption can 
fail. Mendelian segregation, pleiotropy and sexual recombination can lead 
to situations where more successful types produce less successful 
variants. In principle, such features can be integrated into models of 
frequency dependent selection acting within the gene pool, but this can 
lead to intractable dynamics. Moreover, arguments from evolutionary game 
theory can fail, just like optimization arguments from adaptationism, due 
to genetic constraints. In the absence of specific information on the 
genotype-phenotype map, however, evolutionary game theory often provides 
an efficient heuristic tool for understanding frequency-dependent 
adaptation at the phenotypic level. Moreover, it also proved a suitable 
tool to describe social learning and cultural evolution.  
 
 See also the following articles:  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 
Evolution of Cooperation 
Adaptive Dynamics 
Glossary: 
 
Strategy: Rule that describes how an individual acts in a given 
situation.  For example, in an inner-specific contest, possible 
strategies are to fight or to flee. 
Replicator dynamics: A model for the dynamics in evolutionary games. When 
a strategy fares better than the average then this strategy is expected 
to spread in the population.  
Hawk Dove game: A prominent model for animal contests in evolutionary 
game theory. It is assumed that there are two types: ‘Hawks’ escalate a 
fight, in which case ‘Doves’ give up.  When ‘Hawks’ are frequent it is 
better to be a ‘Dove’, in order to avoid serious injuries. Conversely, if 
the population consists of ‘Doves’, then escalating a fight pays off. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma:  A famous game that describes the conflict between 
group-interest and self-interest.  Two individuals may either cooperate 
(C) or defect (D). If both choose C, they are better off than if both 
choose D. However, individually each player prefers to defect, leading to 
a dilemma. 
Payoff:  Number that represents the success of a given strategy. In 
classical game theory, payoffs are described as utilities, whereas 
evolutionary game theory interprets the payoff of a strategy as its 
reproductive success. 
Frequency dependent selection: when the reproductive success of an 
individual does not only depend on its own type, but also on the 
composition of the population. For example, if the sex-ratio in a 
population is biased towards females, then males have an advantage. 
Nash equilibrium: A game is in equilibrium, if none of the players has an 
incentive to deviate from its strategy, as long as the other players 
stick to theirs.  
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Box 1: 
 
A game between two players I and II can be described by its normal form, 
which consists of a list of all the strategies nee ,...,1     and  
mff ,...,1  available to player I and player II, respectively, and of their 
payoff values ija  resp. ijb  obtained when I plays ie   and II plays jf . A 
mixed strategy for player I is given by the vector x  of the 
probabilities ix  to use ie . Since 1...  nxx , the vector ),...,( 1 nxxx   is 
an element of the unit simplex nS  spanned by the vectors of the standard 
basis in nR , i.e., the vectors with 1ix  and 0jx  for ij  , which 
correspond to the pure strategies ie . 
If player I uses strategy x and player II uses y , then the payoff for 
the former is given by the sum of the terms jiij yxa , summed over all i and 
j, and the payoff for the latter by jij yxb . We denote these terms by xAy  
and xBy , respectively.  
The strategy x  is said to be a best reply to strategy y  if zAyxAy   
holds for all z  in nS . In this case, player I cannot expect any gain 
from using a strategy different from x. Similarly, y  is a best reply to 
x if xBwxBy   for all w  in mS . A pair of strategies ),( yx  is said to 
be in Nash equilibrium if both conditions are satisfied, i.e., if each 
strategy is a best reply to the other. In this case, both players have no 
incentive to deviate unilaterally from their strategy. In the special 
case of a zero sum game (i.e., when ijij ba   holds for all i and j), these 
strategies are maximin strategies, i.e., each maximizes the minimal 
payoff and thus guarantees the best security level. 
 
One speaks of a symmetric game if the players have the same sets of 
strategies and payoff values and thus cannot be distinguished. Formally, 
this means that jiij ba   holds for all i and j. In this case, a strategy x  
is said to be a Nash equilibrium if the symmetric pair ),( xx  is a Nash 
equilibrium pair, i.e., if xAxzAx   for all z  in mS .  
 
Box 2 
 
In the simplest formal setup for evolutionary game theory, the 1e  to ne  
correspond to different types of individuals in a large, well mixed 
populations, and the ix  are their relative frequencies (thus, the state 
of the population is given by x in nS ). The game is assumed to be 
symmetric. Since an individual of type ie  randomly meets an je -individual 
with probability jx , and obtains payoff ija  from the interaction, the 
average payoff for ie -players is given by ninii xaxaAx  ...)( 11 , and the 
average payoff in the population by xAx. The frequencies ix  evolve as a 
function of time t, according to their success. If one assumes that the 
per capita growth rate of type ie  is given by the difference between its 
payoff and the average payoff in the population, one obtains the 
replicator equation ])[( xAxAxxdt
dx
ii
i   on the state space nS . Every Nash 
equilibrium is a fixed point of the replicator equation, and every stable 
fixed point is a Nash equilibrium, but the converse statements need not 
hold. 
Figure Captions: 
 
Fig. 1: Payoffs for the Hawk-Dove game: If a hawk encounters another 
hawk, there is an equal chance to win the contest or to get injured, 
resulting in an expected payoff of (G-C)/2. Against doves, a hawk always 
comes off as the winner, leading to a safe payoff of G. The payoffs for 
doves are derived analogously.  
Fig. 2:  Payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (with T>R>P>S):  Irrespective 
of the opponent’s strategy, it is always better to defect, since T>R and 
P>S.  If both players follow this logic they end up with payoff P instead 
of R.  
Fig. 3: Payoffs for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD): When a TFT 
player meets a co-player of the same type, both will cooperate mutually, 
leading to an average payoff of R. Against a co-player who defects always 
(All D), a TFT player stops cooperating after the first round and plays D 
subsequently. If the number of rounds is random and the probability of a 
further round is w, this results in the payoffs displayed in the matrix.  
Fig. 4: Different scenarios for the evolutionary dynamics between two 
strategies:  
(a) Dominance: The blue strategy always out-competes red. Evolution leads 
to the state in which every individual adopts blue.  
(b) Coexistence: Red invades blue and blue invades red. Eventually, there 
is a stable coexistence of both strategies. 
(c) Bi-Stability: Both, red and blue are stable. The eventual outcome 
depends on the initial population. 
Fig. 5: Dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game. Paper beats rock, 
scissors beats paper and rock beats scissors. Depending on the exact 
payoff values, this may either result in closed cycles (left), a stable 
coexistence of all strategies (middle) or never-ending oscillations 
(right). 
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